Every session below starts with an approved change request and ends with evidence tied back to it. No shared passwords. No standing credentials. No screenshots — these are unedited recordings of the product doing the work.
Thirteen demos · databases, cloud platforms, servers and clusters · 3–5 minutes each (Remote Desktop 2:41)
One approved change, a Jupyter notebook doing the work through the product, and a
Change Request Security Review of the result. Standard requests — no cloud SDK, no product
library. In each, the unauthorised action succeeds — the access genuinely permits it. Nothing is
blocked. It is recorded, and the Security Review names it.
The same ticket serves a human at a GUI and an unattended script, and both are recorded. Each connects with a standard driver, runs the approved change, then runs one statement the change request never mentioned — and closes on the Security Review that flags it.
Native clients throughout: OpenSSH, Windows PowerShell, kubectl and
mstsc. Remote Desktop differs by design — an RDP session is captured as a
session replay rather than as statements, so it ends at the recording rather than a Security
Review. There is nothing to compare statements against, and the demo says so rather than implying a
check it does not perform.
Most privileged access tools stop at “who was allowed in”. These demos are about what happened next.
Point 5 is the one worth watching for. In several demos the operator deliberately does something the change request never authorised. You can see the product say so.
mstsc,
kubectl. Nothing is modified, wrapped, or aware the product exists.The operator’s machine never holds a working credential for the target system.
The ticket is typed where a password goes. The database reports back a different account entirely — the one the product holds and the operator never sees.
The ticket goes where an access key or bearer token goes. The provider answers to an identity that did not exist an hour ago: a service principal, a service account or an assumed role created for that single checkout and deleted at check-in.
The ticket is both the access key ID and the secret. There is nothing to leak, because nothing on the machine is a credential anywhere else.
Close the laptop and there is nothing left to revoke.
Real cloud accounts, real databases, a real Windows domain. The resources created on camera exist; they are cleaned up afterwards.
Where traffic passes through the product, TLS is verified against the product’s own certificate authority. Earlier builds of these demos disabled certificate checking and that was removed deliberately — the Kubernetes recording is the one still awaiting a re-record, and you can see the flag left in its kubeconfig on screen.
Silence is trimmed so a 7-minute recording becomes 3–4 minutes, but nothing is sped up, reordered, or re-enacted, and no narration line was cut.
Cloud account and subscription numbers are masked in a few frames. That is the only alteration made to any recording.
Every video ships with a subtitle track carrying the full narration, for accessibility and for viewers who would rather read than listen.
No, and that is deliberate in these demos. The operator holds genuine, time-boxed access, and inside that access the action is permitted. The product’s job here is to make it undeniable: attributed to a named person, tied to a change request, and flagged in the Security Review. Prevention is a policy question; these demos are about evidence.
Yes — that is what it attests. The first cut is built around security guidelines, and on top of that it examines the actions actually performed and scores how closely they match what was authorised. It speaks only to the execution — the change request itself was settled by your change process before the ticket existed. That scoring is in alpha today. It behaves well on the cases in these recordings, and it will keep improving as we train the models further. With design partners we can tune it to your own change vocabulary and control expectations — that is one of the more useful things to work on together.
Then the Security Review says so — approved work, performed, nothing outstanding. Several demos show approved statements passing untouched in the same session as the flagged one.
The cloud and database demos are single continuous sessions. The server and cluster demos join a
browser recording with a native-client recording, because a headless browser cannot drive
mstsc or a terminal. Neither is re-enacted.